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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The potential impact of Brexit has attracted much attention since the referendum in 2016. UK's de-
parture from the EU was due in March 2019, two years after invoking article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
However, the UK's Parliament has rejected the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by the then‐prime 
minister of UK Theresa May, who has ended up resigning. As a result, much uncertainty still sur-
rounds what the future relationship between the UK and the EU will be. With this background, we 
address the following questions in this paper: Which side (UK or EU) will be more harmed? Will the 
UK or EU be able to recover much of its lost trade after Brexit in other regions of the world? Who 
wins in that trade with third nations? What is the role of UK and European multinationals as well as 
multinationals in UK and EU?
Modelling a disintegration process constitutes a rather uncommon analysis.1 However, the economic 
effects of Brexit have been broadly studied and reviewed (e.g. Busch & Matthes, 2016; Chang, 2018; 
Fernández‐Pacheco, Lopez, & Latorre, 2018; and Latorre, Olekseyuk, Yonezawa, & Robinson, 2019). 
The consensus is that it will generate an asymmetric negative outcome in which UK will lose more than 
1 As the last decades are characterised by the deepening of economic integration and the fall in barriers to trade and FDI, 
studies tend to investigate integration processes (e.g. Latorre et al., 2018; Ortiz and Latorre, 2017; Latorre and Yonezawa, 
2018). Some scarce exceptions, however, can be found in the analysis of disinvestments (Gómez‐Plana and Latorre, 2014), of 
FDI decreases during the crisis (Latorre and Hosoe, 2016) and of Crimea's annexation from Ukraine (Olekseyuk and 
Schuerenberg‐Frosch, 2018).
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the Rest of the European Union (REU, henceforth). This paper analyses the impact of two dimensions of 
Brexit, namely trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). It aims at quantifying its effects on a sectoral 
and aggregate level for several regions, with a focus on potential effects on foreign multinationals in 
services and productivity impacts in manufacturing. We use a numerical simulation model with 21 sec-
tors, 11 regions and 4 factors of production, which incorporates a Melitz (2003) structure in manufac-
tures and foreign multinationals operating under imperfect competition in services. This combination 
has not been previously attained in a multiregional framework, to the best of our knowledge.
Our analysis provides original estimations of Brexit impact and contributes to the literature along 
three broad fronts. First, with respect to the mainstream analysis in international economics (e.g. 
Costinot & Rodriguez‐Clare, 2014), we incorporate more simultaneous features of real economies. 
These include multiple sectors, regions and factors of production; trade imbalances; intermediates 
with demand structures reflecting actual data; sector‐specific tariffs as well as nontariff barriers 
(NTBs) to trade and FDI; multinationals operating in services' sectors; and a competitive selection of 
heterogeneous manufacturing firms.
Second, modelling productivity differences across firms within sectors and firms' selection to bi-
lateral markets is an appropriate approach accounting for the features of real economies (e.g. Bernard, 
Jensen, Redding, & Schott, 2007). Most of the previous studies on Brexit neglect this point by apply-
ing an Armington perfect competition setting (e.g. Aichele & Felbermayr, 2015; Ciuriak et al., 2015; 
Dhingra et al., 2017; Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, & Reenen, 2014). Since the debated equivalence of 
welfare impacts of trade among Armington, Krugman and Melitz structures suggested by Arkolakis, 
Costinot, and Rodríguez‐Clare (2012) holds only in a very restrictive setting (see, e.g. Akgul, 2017; 
Balistreri & Tarr, 2017; Costinot & Rodriguez‐Clare, 2014), most of the analyses of Brexit with the 
Armington setting could be considered as a lower bound impact.
Third, we additionally incorporate multinationals in services into the path‐breaking numerical sim-
ulation model of Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) with the full Melitz structure in several 
sectors. Given the particularly intense specialisation of UK economy in services, such as finance, in-
surance, telecommunications and business services, an analysis of mode 3 provision of services (i.e. 
through foreign affiliates sales) is of high relevance. Moreover, our sensitivity analysis illustrates that 
dropping the FDI barriers and monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms (i.e. similar set-
ting to Ottaviano et al., 2014 and Dhingra et al., 2017) would generate an underestimated Brexit im-
pact by approximately 50%.2
Our results suggest that the UK experiences much more sizeable losses in its welfare, foreign 
trade, production, average industry productivity, wages and capital remuneration than the REU 
does. A hard Brexit (i.e. reversion to WTO rules) would reduce welfare in the UK by −3.17% (in 
REU by −0.59%), while the impact of a soft Brexit (e.g. a post‐Brexit arrangement similar to 
Norway) would be about a half of the negative impact of the hard one in both regions. We also 
observe higher welfare losses along the extensive margin for the UK illustrating the fact that the 
UK loses many imported varieties (produced by highly productive European firms) with low prices 
and high quantities, while the new domestic varieties are produced by firms with lower productivity 
and therefore at high prices and small quantities. Indeed, the results for average productivity of 
domestic firms in the UK confirm this with a decline by up to −2.27% in several manufacturing 
sectors such as textiles, chemicals, motor vehicles and electronics. Thus, less productive firms enter 
the British market due to increased protectionism and reduced import competition. Moreover, our 
2 While the magnitude of Brexit impact quantified by Ottaviano et al. (2014) and Dhingra et al. (2017) is comparable with our 
results, note that their policy assumptions of Brexit are different from ours. Specifically, they incorporate missed future 
opportunities of further EU integration, which generates the lion's share of losses accounting for more than half of the total 
effect. In contrast, we incorporate the FDI barriers, which lead to one third of the welfare loss.
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inclusion of FDI in services also constitutes an extra source for losses since an increase in FDI 
barriers explains approximately one third of the overall fall in GDP, welfare and wages in the UK 
and REU. Concerning outsiders (i.e. the United States, China, India, Japan, other advanced econo-
mies, South‐East Asia, Latin America, Middle East and sub‐Saharan Africa), the impact is negligi-
ble at the aggregate level.3
Our study has the following structure. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the production and 
trade structure of the REU and UK. In Section 3, we explain the model structure and scenarios. In 
Section 4, we analyse sectoral and aggregate outcomes, while Section 5 offers a sensitivity analysis 
for our results. Main conclusions are presented in Section 6. The algebraic description of the model is 
offered in online Appendix S1.
2 |  TRADE AND PRODUCTION STRUCTURE OF THE UK 
AND THE REST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (REU)
Tables 1 and 2 offer data on capital and labour intensity, value added, as well as several indicators 
related to exports and imports for the REU and UK, respectively. The information is available for the 
21 sectors included in the model.4 The bottom rows of the table also show some summarising aggre-
gates for manufacturing, services and all the sectors.
The information refers to 2020, which is the base year in our modelling application.5 The first two 
columns present information on capital and labour intensity across sectors. In particular, we offer each 
sector's share of labour and capital remuneration in total costs.6 The structure of value added (i.e. the 
shares of all the sectors in total value added of the economy) appears in the third column. The next 
columns display the weight of each sector in aggregate exports and imports and the shares of each of 
the Brexit partners (i.e. the UK and REU) in exports and imports of the other partner. In the case of 
REU, we also present the share of intra‐EU imports and exports in separate columns, given its impor-
tance for trade within the REU.
We can see that in the REU and in UK services' sectors are more labour intensive and tend to 
generate a larger share of value added per unit of production than manufactures (i.e. the sum of labour 
and capital remuneration shares in total costs is larger in services than in manufactures). 31.4% and 
36.7% of total costs in services' sectors go to labour remuneration in the REU and in UK, respectively. 
On the other hand, the services' specialisation of the UK is more intense than the one in the REU. 
Their respective shares in total value added are of 75.9% versus 67.2%. However, looking at the next 
columns, we see that contrasting with the structure of value added the bulk of trade is concentrated 
in manufacturing. This reflects a global tendency, which has been analysed in detail in Latorre and 
Yonezawa (2018) and Latorre, Yonezawa, and Zhou (2018).
3 Our negative results are lower than the ones obtained in macroeconomic models that include uncertainty (e.g. HM Treasury, 
2016a,2016b; OECD 2016). See Latorre et al. (2019) and Fernández‐Pacheco et al. (2018) for a comprehensive comparison 
of Brexit studies including ours.
4 Table A1 presents sectors' description and their mapping between different sectoral classifications.
5 We update the initial data for 2011, which is the latest version available of the database GTAP 9 (Aguiar et al., 2016), using 
IMF (2016) projections. See Section 3 for details.
6 The total costs of production include expenses not only for labour and capital, but also for intermediate inputs, for land in 
agriculture and for natural resources in agriculture and other primary goods. Therefore, reported labour and capital shares in 
Tables 1 and 2 represent just a part of total costs.
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Table 2 shows that the REU is a crucial trade partner for UK. 46.9% and 48.4% of UK's ag-
gregate exports and imports, respectively, take place with the REU. This dependency is of much 
relevance in general across all the sectors. The UK, by contrast, explains only around 6.3% (of 
exports) or 5.3% (of imports) of REU trade, once intra‐EU trade has been taken into account (see 
Table 1). The bulk of REU trade within the EU‐27 is very high with 49.2% and 52.3% of its total 
exports and imports, respectively. However, intra‐REU trade is more important for manufactures 
than for services. Similarly, the UK is more integrated in services than in manufactures with third 
nations. In other words, within the former EU‐28 trade integration was stronger in manufacturing 
than in services.
T A B L E  1  Trade and GDP structure of the Rest of the European Union in 2020 (in percentage)
Sectors
% Share in total 
costs of remu-
neration of % Shares in total
% Share going to 
(coming from) UK
% Share of Intra‐
EU trade
Labor Capital
Value 
added Exports Imports
In 
exports
In 
imports
In 
exports
In 
imports
CRTS sectors Agriculture 31.9 13.2 2.8 1.4 2.4 6.4 2.4 65.3 55.8
Other primary 17.9 20.5 0.7 1.0 17.1 12.4 3.4 38.8 4.0
Wood and paper 21.1 14.5 2.3 3.2 1.7 7.1 3.4 59.3 75.1
Personal services 30.3 26.9 3.4 1.4 1.2 7.4 7.2 43.5 50.6
Other services 33.1 24.7 39.3 7.9 6.9 5.2 3.2 43.0 48.9
IRTS sectors 
with Melitz 
structure
Food 15.4 14.6 3.3 5.0 3.1 9.5 5.0 59.1 72.5
Textiles 21.5 10.7 1.2 2.7 5.9 6.3 2.6 58.9 42.6
Chemicals 11.7 10.1 3.7 17.7 15.3 5.9 6.3 52.5 58.9
Metals 21.1 11.0 3.0 6.8 5.5 5.5 3.8 58.6 66.1
Motor vehicles 15.4 6.9 1.7 9.8 3.3 8.7 5.4 53.3 79.0
Other transport 19.3 6.3 0.6 3.4 2.9 5.0 6.0 37.4 44.5
Electronics 15.6 11.5 0.8 3.5 7.2 7.6 3.8 52.4 37.4
Other machinery 24.2 10.2 4.4 19.2 10.3 4.6 4.0 42.0 60.1
Other manufactures 22.3 13.4 1.7 2.7 2.4 6.2 4.1 47.9 53.0
Construction 24.1 18.3 6.7 1.3 0.7 1.5 2.5 31.5 48.0
IRTS services 
with 
multinationas
Water transport 6.5 6.0 0.4 1.1 0.8 4.5 3.4 34.4 46.3
Air transport 11.8 3.0 0.4 2.7 2.0 9.3 7.6 28.1 38.0
Communications 29.1 15.5 2.7 0.5 0.8 9.5 11.1 43.7 43.6
Finance 32.6 12.9 4.1 0.9 2.4 8.0 16.4 47.7 36.0
Insurance 25.2 7.3 1.2 1.0 0.4 2.6 9.8 20.8 43.5
Business services 30.7 16.5 15.7 6.8 7.6 4.7 12.7 42.2 43.0
Aggre‐gates Total manufacturing 19.0 12.3 30.0 76.3 75.5 6.4 4.6 51.1 54.2
Total services 31.4 21.2 67.2 22.3 22.1 5.8 8.7 40.3 44.5
Total 25.7 17.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.3 5.3 49.2 52.3
Note: Table A1 presents sectors' description and their mapping between different sectoral classifications. The share of intra‐EU trade 
excludes trade with the UK.
Source: Authors' estimations based on Aguiar et al. (2016) and in IMF (2016) for the projections.
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3 |  MODEL AND SIMULATIONS
This study applies an original multiregion, multisector and multifactor general‐equilibrium numerical 
simulation model to evaluate the impact of Brexit.7 One of the innovations is that our model is among 
the few numerical models incorporating the operations of foreign multinationals (Tarr, 2013; Latorre, 
2009) in advanced services' sectors.8 The impact of FDI varies depending on the services' sector to 
which they accrue, which is in accordance with the fact that the effects of multinationals vary across 
sectors (Latorre, 2012, 2013; Zhou & Latorre, 2014a, 2014b). Data on the sales of foreign 
7 The complete algebraic description of the model can be found in the Appendix S1.
8 The advanced services' sectors include water transport, air transport, communication, finance, insurance and business 
services.
T A B L E  2  Trade and GDP structure of the UK in 2020 (in percentage)
Sectors
% Share in total 
costs of remunera-
tion of % Shares in total
% Share going to (coming 
from) REU
Labor Capital
Value 
added Exports Imports In exports In imports
CRTS sectors Agriculture 30.4 9.8 1.1 0.8 2.1 71.3 48.7
Other primary 7.0 44.2 2.1 3.8 7.0 68.0 11.4
Wood and paper 31.2 12.4 2.0 2.1 3.5 48.7 62.0
Personal services 32.4 21.0 3.3 1.7 1.5 44.4 46.6
Other services 39.3 21.7 46.6 5.5 6.3 33.4 43.9
IRTS sectors with 
Melitz structure
Food 23.3 13.0 2.7 4.1 6.1 57.9 74.7
Textiles 36.2 9.2 0.9 1.8 5.4 62.3 30.3
Chemicals 17.3 6.7 2.5 18.2 14.8 55.1 57.9
Metals 27.0 5.6 1.5 6.5 9.9 40.1 35.2
Motor vehicles 21.8 4.5 1.0 7.7 8.4 47.8 84.3
Other transport 27.3 8.6 0.9 4.1 2.9 32.7 36.6
Electronics 22.2 11.9 0.5 3.1 5.2 58.5 41.5
Other machinery 29.8 10.0 2.6 12.3 10.7 35.6 54.7
Other manufactures 26.6 12.1 1.2 2.3 3.3 38.0 36.9
Construction 22.1 18.2 5.2 0.4 0.3 34.0 37.6
IRTS ser-
vices with 
multinationas
Water transport 23.8 3.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 42.0 56.7
Air transport 12.7 4.7 0.4 3.0 2.7 34.4 51.2
Communications 38.1 14.0 3.5 0.7 1.0 72.9 50.0
Finance 21.2 6.6 4.3 5.8 2.2 44.2 37.0
Insurance 20.5 4.6 1.6 1.5 0.3 16.9 52.6
Business services 39.3 12.7 15.6 14.0 5.7 50.7 35.3
Aggre‐gates Total manufacturing 23.4 12.4 23.0 66.4 77.5 48.2 49.9
Total services 36.7 17.8 75.9 32.8 20.4 43.7 42.7
Total 32.1 15.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 46.9 48.4
Note: Table A1 presents sectors' description and their mapping between different sectoral classifications.
Source: Authors' estimations based on Aguiar et al. (2016) and in IMF (2016) for the projections.
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multinationals across different regions and services stem from the US International Trade Commission 
Database (Fukui & Lakatos, 2012).9
Moreover, we apply a competitive selection model of heterogeneous firms consistent with Melitz 
(2003) in manufactures and construction.10 Simultaneously, services' sectors with multinationals op-
erate under monopolistic competition á la Krugman (1980) which, therefore, implies firm‐level prod-
uct differentiation of symmetric varieties. The rest of sectors in the model exhibit a climate of perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale.
Our model is innovative as it applies Melitz structure to more than one manufacturing sector and 
jointly allows for the presence of multinational firms supplying business services in the host country. 
While each of the aforementioned characteristics is already included in previous studies, their combi-
nation has not been previously implemented, to the best of our knowledge.
Let us put these characteristics in perspective with other numerical models. Several models include a 
Melitz structure but it tends to be constrained to one sector only (e.g. Akgul, Hertel, & Villoria, 2016; 
Dixon, Jerie, & Rimmer, 2016; Oyamada, Nabeshima, & Michida, 2015), while in the present paper we 
include it in ten manufacturing sectors. Others include Melitz structure in several sectors of their models 
(Hosoe, 2018; Petri & Plummer, 2016; Petri, Plummer, & Zhai, 2012). Petri and Plummer (2016) and 
Petri et al. (2012) omit firms' entry and exit in their approach.11 That is a crucial feature in a Melitz setting, 
which is included in our model. In this sense, the present model follows the path‐breaking approach of 
introducing Melitz in a numerical model by Balistreri et al. (2011) to which we add the presence of foreign 
multinationals in services. In contrast to other models that include multinationals, which are scarce, our 
specification incorporates imperfect competition, which seems to be more appropriate for sectors where 
multinationals operate. Some models, reviewed by Tarr (2013) and Latorre (2009), adopt a Dixit–Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition framework only in manufactures (e.g. Balistreri, Tarr, & Yonezawa, 2015).12 In 
contrast, the present model extends monopolistic competition to business services following Latorre and 
Yonezawa (2018) and Latorre et al. (2018), while additionally incorporating Melitz structure in manufac-
turing. Thus, our present model is closer to the one of Olekseyuk (2016), who already had Melitz in 
manufacturing with imperfect competition and multinationals in services, but multinationals with imper-
fect competition were modelled only in one of the regions of the multiregional setting. In our model, FDI 
and multinationals are present in all considered regions. The present study can be also considered as an 
extension of the work by Olekseyuk and Balistreri (2018), who run Melitz, Krugman and Armington 
version of the model in a multiregional and multisector setting, but do not include the operations of mul-
tinationals in services.
The initial database for the majority of micro and macroeconomic variables, as well as 
the input–output data of the model, comes from the latest version of the GTAP Database 
9 We include FDI only in advanced services' sectors due to the data availability of NTBs for the operations of multinationals.
10 We model a Melitz structure in manufacturing sectors with the share of intraindustry trade over 60% of total trade following 
Olekseyuk and Balistreri (2018). This is the case for food, textiles, chemicals, metals, motor vehicles, other transport, electronics, 
other machinery, other manufactures and construction; that is, all manufacturing sectors except for wood and paper as well as 
other primary products. This matches the idea that a climate of monopolistic competition is related to trade in different varieties 
of the same product. Also, note that since the important parameter of Melitz structure (namely the shape parameter of Pareto 
distribution) is estimated for manufacturing sectors in Balistreri et al. (2011), we do not apply this structure to service sectors.
11 To be more precise, there is no firm entry or exit in Melitz sectors in the studies of Petri & Plummer (2016) and Petri et al. 
(2012). Therefore, the total number of firms is exogenous and fixed. However, Melitz sectors still exhibit endogenous firm 
selection into bilateral markets.
12 Balistreri et al. (2015), in turn, are the first to develop a multiregional numerical simulation model in a literature of ‘FDI in 
services’, which had been previously constrained to single country models (e.g. Latorre, 2016).
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(GTAP 9, Aguiar, Narayanan, & McDougall, 2016). Our model includes 11 regions, 21 
sectors13 and four types of production factors, namely land, capital, labour and natural re-
sources.14 GTAP 9 resembles the world economy in 2011, and we conduct the forward cal-
ibration using IMF (2016) GDP projections for 2020 (following the technique described in 
Böhringer, Löschel, Moslener, & Rutherford, 2009). This year seems to be a reasonable 
benchmark for estimation of the initial impact of Brexit. Therefore, it will be our reference 
year for the simulations.
To quantify the impact of Brexit, we simulate two different scenarios: hard and soft Brexit (following 
Ottaviano et al., 2014; Dhingra et al., 2017 and Chang, 2018). In the case of hard Brexit (i.e. a "no deal" 
reversion to WTO rules), we increase import tariffs between the REU and UK to the trade weighted av-
erage MFN level calculated using the external tariff rates of the REU and UK's bilateral trade flows with 
the rest of the EU. Moreover, the UK and REU will face an increase in their respective bilateral NTBs 
equivalent to 50% of NTBs that the United States faces on EU markets.15 We also assume an increase in 
existent FDI barriers between the UK and REU by 50%. In the case of soft Brexit (i.e. a post‐Brexit ar-
rangement similar to the one that Norway has with the EU, in line with UK's current proposal), we re-
main zero import tariffs, but increase the NTBs and FDI barriers by 25%.16
The scenarios seem to be a good choice to illustrate the potential outcomes of Brexit given no 
significant progress in the negotiations between the REU and UK. The MFN treatment is a possible 
scenario if the REU and UK are not able to negotiate a trade deal. It also represents the worst scenario 
for the Brexit partners. However, it seems reasonable that the UK will get an agreement with low tar-
iffs or even a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, which could be closer to the soft Brexit 
or to the NTBs' components of the hard Brexit scenario.
For calculation of the potential tariff rates between the REU and UK, we use the external applied 
MFN tariffs of the EU from TRAINS for 2015 as well as trade flows for 2014. As the raw data are 
available on a disaggregated level only, we applied several correspondence tables from WITS to cal-
culate both:
1. trade‐weighted MFN tariff rates that the UK might apply against the EU (weighted with 
UK's imports from the EU); and
2. trade‐weighted MFN tariff rates that the EU might apply against the UK (weighted with UK's ex-
ports to the EU).
13 Recall that Table A1 presents description of sectors and their mapping between different sectoral classifications. Table A2 
offers the regional composition.
14 As commonly done in the literature, we model natural resources as a fixed factor of production in agriculture and other 
primary sector, which includes the extraction of coal, crude oil and natural gas. Land is also a fixed production factor in 
agriculture. Therefore, the output change as such is, to some extent, limited.
15 The NTBs to trade stem from Ecorys (2009) who additionally estimated the share of rents and efficiency losses that were 
behind the NTBs between Europe and the United States. On average, 60% of the costs of the NTBs were found to be 
efficiency losses, while 40% would create rents. Additionally, they calculated that 2/3 of the rents were earned by importers 
and 1/3 by exporters. The 60% of efficiency losses are modelled as iceberg costs, using a common approach. Ecorys (2009) 
did not provide the barriers for ‘Agriculture’, ‘Other manufacturing’ and ‘Other services’. For those sectors, we take the 
estimations used by Latorre and Yonezawa (2018).
16 The UK faces less barriers (and, therefore, costs) in the European markets than the United States does. Therefore, we 
increase UK‐REU barriers by a fraction of the total barrier. It is hard to know the percentage costs, so we follow the approach 
of Ottaviano et al. (2014) and Dhingra et al. (2017).
8 |   LATORRE ET AL.
Our calculations of FDI barriers between the UK and REU are based on the product market regulation 
(PMR) indicators derived by the OECD (Koske, Wanner, Bitetti, & Barbiero, 2015). They are appropriate 
to deal with the EU internal market (ECSIP Consortium, 2014) and should be a good indicator to capture 
the differences among EU regulations.17 Due to the common market, we cannot think of a more integrated 
region comprising different countries as the EU. However, it is also true that particularly in services, for-
eign multinationals from other EU countries do face barriers in their operations within the EU (Monteagudo, 
Rutkowsky, & Lorenzani, 2012; Mustilli & Pelkmans, 2013). Indeed, Jafari and Tarr (2017) provide dif-
ferent barriers to FDI in services across European countries. Therefore, we take outward sales of UK 
17 The OECD PMR Indicators represent a comprehensive and internationally comparable set of indicators that measure the 
degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition. We work with the recently updated ‘trade and investment indicator’ 
since there is no estimation separating trade versus FDI.
T A B L E  3  Cost increases due to MFN tariffs, NTBs to trade and NTBs to FDI that the Brexit would imply
Sectors
MFN tariffs NTBs to trade NTBs to FDI 
Hard Brexit
Soft 
Brexit
Hard 
Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
In 
REU
In 
UK
In REU 
and UK
In REU 
and UK
In 
REU
In 
UK
In 
REU
In 
UK
CRTS sectors Agriculture 10.2 10.8 14.2 28.4
Other primary 0.0 0.1 14.2 28.4
Wood and paper 0.5 1.0 2.8 5.7
Personal services 1.1 2.2
Other services 1.1 2.2
IRTS sectors 
with Melitz 
structure
Food 19.8 22.0 14.2 28.4
Textiles 10.0 9.5 4.8 9.6
Chemicals 2.8 2.7 3.4 6.8
Metals 1.9 2.0 3.0 6.0
Motor vehicles 8.0 8.8 6.4 12.8
Other transport 1.7 1.6 4.7 9.4
Electronics 0.9 1.5 3.2 6.4
Other machinery 1.7 1.8 0.0 0.0
Other manufactures 2.6 2.2 2.8 5.7
Construction 1.2 2.3
IRTS ser-
vices with 
multinationas
Water transport 2.0 4.0 2.8 0.0 5.6 0.0
Air transport 0.5 1.0 4.6 4.7 9.1 9.3
Communications 2.9 5.9 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4
Finance 2.8 5.7 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1
Insurance 2.7 5.4 2.7 2.8 5.5 5.6
Business services 3.7 7.5 7.9 4.8 15.8 9.7
Note: See note in Table 2.
Source: for the NTBs Ecorys (2009), Latorre and Yonezawa (2018) and Latorre et al. (2018); TRAINS and WITS for tariffs and Jafari 
and Tarr (2017) and Koske et al. (2015) for barriers to FDI.
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multinationals in different EU countries and use them as weights to derive the total FDI barrier in the EU 
in each services' sector.18
Table 3 shows the increases in trade costs related to the barriers that will emerge between the 
EU and UK after Brexit. The first two columns show the resulting MFN tariffs that we model as 
an element of the hard Brexit. The next two columns present the NTBs related to trade and the 
final four columns the NTBs related to FDI in services. For both types of NTBs, we have a soft 
and hard version with the above mentioned 25% and 50% shares of the total values of the NTBs, 
respectively.
Table 3 shows that barriers are heterogeneous across sectors. With respect to trade barriers, they 
tend to be larger in agriculture, other primary (although only in the case of NTBs since tariffs are 
nearly zero), food, textiles, motor vehicles and other transport. For barriers to FDI, they tend to be 
particularly high in business services and to a lesser extent in air transport. These sectors with high 
barriers are likely to be the most affected by Brexit.
Our modelling strategy consists of introducing what at first sight could be considered as rather high 
barriers related to trade and FDI.19 We do this on purpose for two reasons: first, in order to provide an 
upper bound (or strongest impact) that Brexit could imply for both the REU and UK, and second, to 
better grasp whether Brexit could have any effects for outsiders. In any case, it is important to note, 
that after the initial assessment of barriers made by Ecorys (2009), Egger, Francois, Manchin, and 
Nelson (2015) have updated the estimations including even larger barriers to trade than the ones ap-
plied here, which tends to magnify the impact of the shock analysed.
4 |  RESULTS
4.1 | Microeconomic impact
4.1.1 | Bilateral trade within the Brexit block, intra‐REU trade and trade 
with third nations
The direct impact of the emergence of trade and FDI barriers caused by Brexit will occur for bilateral 
trade flows between the UK and REU (Rest of the European Union). This shock will be later spread 
to trade flows with other regions. Table 4 displays three blocks of results: (a) trade within the Brexit 
block where we consider both REU imports from the UK (or UK exports to REU) and REU exports 
to the UK (or UK imports from the REU); (b) trade of the Brexit block with third nations where we 
show the results of the REU and UK joint exports to the ROW (Rest of the World) and their joint 
imports from the ROW; and (c) intra‐REU trade which presents imports or exports within the EU‐27. 
We illustrate the impact of the soft and hard Brexit for all the sectors of the model as well as for the 
selected aggregates.
18 We first take the FDI barriers as provided by Jafari and Tarr (2017). They provide estimations for 20 countries (instead of 
28). Since the UK is one of the 20 countries, we use the estimates of the other 19 to proxy the FDI barriers for the REU. 
Second, we weight each country's barrier with the share of outward sales of UK multinationals in that country in overall UK 
outward sales going to the REU (using Eurostat, 2016 data). The FDI barrier that UK multinationals face is high (small) in 
sectors with large UK sales in the EU countries with tight (flexible) regulations.
19 UK is currently in compliance with the EU regulations, so most of the barriers will tend to grow as time passes by and 
regulations drift apart. However, depending on the type of trade relationship stemming from the negotiations, controls on the 
borders and other delays may arise automatically when Brexit is applied.
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The reductions of trade flows between the UK and REU are pervasive.20 The patterns of sectoral 
adjustments are parallel in percentage changes for exports and imports. This reflects the importance 
of the depth of the barriers that emerge with Brexit and vary across sectors, as shown in Table 3. The 
larger the increase in barriers is, the stronger the contraction in trade is. That is why hard Brexit brings 
about stronger reductions in trade than the soft one, as the aggregate results for all the sectors show. It 
also explains why contractions of trade in manufactures are larger than in services. Table 3 clearly 
shows that barriers in services tend to be smaller than the ones in manufactures. As a consequence, 
trade in services is less affected than trade in manufacturing.
Looking at the Brexit block in detail, REU imports from the UK decrease by −21.77% and 
−46.52% for aggregated manufacturing sectors and by −6.62% and −13.97% for aggregated services 
in the soft and hard Brexit simulation, respectively. For REU exports to the UK, in manufacturing they 
fall by −16.72% and −40.17% in the soft and hard Brexit case, while in services the respective figures 
are −5.27% % and −9.01%. Overall, aggregate bilateral trade flows would shrink considerably with 
REU imports diminishing by −17.15% or −36.44% in the soft and hard Brexit scenario, respectively, 
while REU exports would decrease by −14.91% and −34.94%. In general, sectors with the strongest 
reductions of trade flows are those with the largest barriers such as agriculture, other primary and food 
products, textiles and motor vehicles. The only sector with increased exports from the REU to UK 
is air transport in the hard Brexit scenario. Due to high FDI barrier in this sector (over 9%) and low 
NTB to trade (only 1%), European multinationals will switch from local supply in the UK (FDI case) 
to cross‐border supply, that is export of services.
The results on trade flows with third nations illustrate that after the emergence of trade and FDI 
barriers between the UK and REU, exporters in both regions lose sales opportunities within the Brexit 
region and look for new export destinations. In particular, total REU and UK exports to the ROW 
increase by 0.43% or 0.94% in the soft and hard Brexit simulation, respectively. The overall increase 
looks rather moderate, although we have to consider that this percentage changes apply to trade flows 
that are very large in absolute terms. On the sectoral level, other primary goods, food products, textiles 
and agriculture tend to experience a stronger increase in exports to third nations. These are, in general, 
the sectors in which exports between the Brexit partners contract the most. Due to a trade diversion 
effect, exports to third regions in these sectors expand stronger than in the rest. The joint REU and 
UK imports of manufactures from third nations tend to exhibit a similar pattern as for exports: total 
20 Red‐shaded cells indicate reductions.
T A B L E  5  Estimations for the capacity to recover in other markets the lost trade within the Brexit block (% 
changes with respect to the initial data)
% of REU exports to the UK which is recovered
% of UK exports to 
REU which is 
With REU exports to the rest 
of partners
With intra‐REU 
exports
Recovered: with UK 
exports to third nations
Soft Hard Soft Hard Soft Hard
All manufactures 31.5 33.9 16.8 16.9 7.7 2.8
All services 68.0 106.9 14.0 17.5 3.2 −6.6
Total 33.7 37.1 16.7 16.8 6.9 1.6
Source: Authors' estimations.
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manufacturing imports increase by up to 1.31% in the hard Brexit case. In particular, motor vehicles, 
food industry, other primary, metals, chemicals, other transport and agriculture extend their imports 
from the ROW strongly. This evolution largely explains the increase in aggregate imports from the 
ROW: the soft (hard) Brexit brings an increase of 0.43% (0.95%).
The trend of joint REU and UK services' imports from third nations is somewhat different at first 
sight: while total manufacturing imports increase, total imports of services decline by up to 0.61% in 
the hard Brexit case (see Table 4). In the soft Brexit simulation, both the REU and UK experience a 
small reduction in services imports from third countries by approximately −0.2%. However, in the 
case of hard Brexit it holds only for the REU: European services' imports decline by −0.79%, while 
the UK increases its services' imports by 0.38%.21 Therefore, in the UK we observe increased services' 
imports from the ROW with higher trade barriers in the hard Brexit case, meaning that there is trade 
diversion towards third countries in order to satisfy domestic demand for services. In contrast, the 
21 The separate results for trade flows of UK and REU to third countries are not reported in Table 4 due to space limitations.
T A B L E  6  Impact on productivity in Melitz sectors and Feenstra ratio (% changes with respect to the initial data)
Sectors
Domestic productivity Industry productivity Feenstra ratio
Soft Hard Soft Hard Soft Hard
REU UK REU UK REU UK REU UK REU UK REU UK
Food −0.21 −1.22 −0.41 −2.12 −0.26 −1.14 −1.10 −2.76 −0.10 −1.74 −0.15 −2.87
Textiles −0.09 −0.77 −0.28 −2.27 −0.08 −0.72 −0.45 −2.37 −0.08 −0.75 −0.19 −1.47
Chemicals −0.10 −0.99 −0.24 −2.27 −0.07 −0.92 −0.22 −2.18 −0.08 −0.53 −0.15 −1.26
Metals −0.05 −0.64 −0.12 −1.59 −0.03 −0.57 −0.12 −1.48 −0.03 −0.28 −0.07 −0.43
Motor vehicles −0.21 −2.27 −0.62 −2.27 −0.18 −2.08 −0.65 −2.34 −0.14 −2.37 −0.32 −6.46
Other transport −0.14 −0.92 −0.28 −1.90 −0.10 −0.84 −0.28 −1.83 −0.07 −0.40 −0.13 −0.74
Electronics −0.11 −1.40 −0.26 −2.27 −0.09 −1.29 −0.24 −2.15 −0.06 −0.51 −0.11 −1.24
Other machinery 0.01 0.06 −0.01 −0.60 0.01 0.04 −0.01 −0.54 −0.02 −0.11 −0.05 −0.19
Other 
manufactures
−0.03 −0.22 −0.08 −0.67 −0.02 −0.20 −0.09 −0.64 −0.05 −0.40 −0.10 −0.72
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.04 −0.01 −0.06 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01 −0.08
Source: Authors' estimations.
T A B L E  7  Variety impact: weighted number of firms in services' sectors (% change with respect to the initial 
data)
Sector
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
REU UK REU UK
Water transport −0.16 −0.22 −0.28 −0.86
Air  transport −0.49 −3.83 −0.66 −15.37
Communications −0.18 −0.64 −0.37 −1.41
Finance −0.07 −0.82 −0.13 −1.76
Insurance −0.37 −0.99 −0.85 −2.11
Business services −0.15 −1.63 −0.30 −3.24
Source: Authors' estimations.
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REU is able to replace a part of lost imports via increased intra‐REU trade, which is seen in the last 
two columns of Table 4. Thus, there is no need to increase services' imports from the ROW. 
Furthermore, European demand for services seems to drop strongly in the hard Brexit scenario, so that 
the REU do not increase services' imports from the ROW. This is consistent with the overall result for 
the REU that even with reduced domestic output and total imports, exports of services are slightly 
increased.
Intra‐EU trade reflects similar patterns as trade with third nations. After experiencing the emer-
gence of significant barriers with the UK, REU firms will have strong incentives to search for markets 
or providers within the REU area, where no barriers exist. Therefore, after the soft Brexit intra‐REU 
trade grows by 0.32%, while for the hard Brexit it rises by 0.75%.
4.1.2 | Capacity to recover in other markets the lost trade within the Brexit 
block, productivity and variety losses
As mentioned in the introduction, we aim at answering the following questions: Will the UK or REU 
be able to recover much of its lost trade after Brexit in other regions of the world? Who wins in that 
trade with third nations? Table 5 presents at its left the results for the percentage of REU lost exports 
to the UK that is recovered via REU exports to the rest of partners and separately via intra‐REU 
T A B L E  8  Variety impacts in Melitz sectors (% change with respect to the initial data)
Sectors
British firms 
supplying REU 
market
Domestic 
firms in UK
Raw varieties 
consumed in 
UK
European firms 
supplying UK 
market
Domestic 
firms in 
REU
Raw varieties 
consumed in 
REU
Hard Brexit
Chemicals −38.08 9.50 6.50 −34.71 0.98 −1.28
Construction −10.31 −0.15 −2.15 −12.42 −0.02 −1.39
Electronics −30.97 7.63 7.09 −27.00 1.05 −1.12
Food −92.63 13.65 17.73 −88.86 1.08 −5.73
Metals −34.20 7.41 5.16 −29.35 0.55 −1.95
Motor vehicles −68.08 19.61 36.42 −48.23 1.52 −2.42
Other machinery −9.80 2.62 1.65 −7.87 0.18 −0.73
Other manufacturing −35.72 3.15 0.58 −32.14 0.27 −2.35
Other transport −42.34 7.92 4.27 −40.38 1.37 −1.25
Textiles −64.37 9.94 4.67 −61.04 0.96 −3.51
Soft Brexit
Chemicals −14.28 4.45 2.57 −13.89 0.34 −0.47
Construction −4.43 −0.08 −1.46 −7.29 −0.01 −0.55
Electronics −14.34 4.99 3.61 −11.65 0.43 −0.50
Food −54.11 6.93 7.18 −43.67 0.59 −3.05
Metals −13.84 3.06 1.92 −11.82 0.23 −0.75
Motor vehicles −28.83 10.56 12.32 −15.47 0.68 −0.93
Other machinery 0.32 −0.08 −0.38 −0.41 −0.01 −0.13
Other manufacturing −12.75 1.26 −0.17 −13.19 0.08 −0.86
Other transport −20.21 3.89 2.02 −19.36 0.63 −0.59
Textiles −20.70 3.31 1.15 −20.15 0.29 −1.18
Source: Authors' estimations.
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exports. Note that trade with the ‘rest of partners’ includes trade within the REU (i.e. intra‐REU trade) 
and trade with third nations. In the right part of Table 5, we present the results for the percentage of 
UK lost exports to the REU that is recovered with UK exports to third nations.
Let us begin with the capacity of REU to recover the exports it loses with the UK by conducting 
more trade with all partners.22 We can see that the percentages of total trade recovered are approxi-
mately one third (33.7% and 37.1% after a soft and hard Brexit, respectively). Around half of the trade 
recovered is via intra‐REU trade, while the other half is via trade with nations outside the Brexit block. 
In contrast, UK's capacity to recover its lost exports with the REU by trading with other partners is 
considerably smaller. The UK could recover as much as 6.9% in the soft Brexit scenario and virtually 
nothing (just 1.6%) in the case of hard Brexit.23
Looking at the trade in services, the story is very different for the two Brexit partners. In particular, 
the REU recovers much of the services' exports lost with the UK by exporting more services to third 
nations rather than via intra‐REU trade expansion. The REU is also more successful in recovering 
exports in services than in manufacturing. In the UK, the situation is opposite – it is able to recover 
more trade in manufacturing than in services. Moreover, while in the soft Brexit scenario at least 3.2% 
of UK exports to the REU can be recovered by increased trade with third countries, there are even 
further losses in the hard Brexit case.24 This illustrates that UK's services' sectors will be suffering 
from Brexit most, which is consistent with the impact on sectoral output in Table 9.
The fact that the REU outperforms the export capacity of the UK is intuitive given that the REU 
still has access to the huge common market, while the UK has lost that preferential access to the REU. 
This implies that European exporters should be able to retain important economies of scale after 
Brexit, while UK exporters should be more harmed. With implemented Melitz structure, we can cap-
ture the evolution of (a) average productivity for firms operating in domestic markets (domestic pro-
ductivity) and (b) industry‐wide average productivity which also accounts for firms' exit and entry to/
from third markets (see Table 6). The results indicate a reduction in both domestic‐wide productivity 
and industry‐wide productivity for the Brexit partners in almost all the sectors.25 However, the magni-
tude is much lower in the case of the REU. While the maximal decline of domestic productivity in the 
REU occurs in motor vehicle sector with −0.63% in the hard Brexit scenario, in the UK this value 
amounts to −2.27% in several sectors such as textiles, chemicals, motor vehicles and electronics. This 
decrease in average productivity indicates entry of less productive firms due to increased protection-
ism and therefore less import competition. The fall of industry‐wide productivity is even more pro-
nounced in the UK with the maximum of −2.76% in food processing for the hard Brexit case. 
Comparing both productivity measures, we see that productivity is generally falling due to domestic 
entry of less productive firms and not because of exit from export markets, as the domestic firms' 
productivity decrease is relatively large.
In addition to the negative producer‐side impacts of Brexit, there are also negative consumer‐
side variety effects. Looking at the changes in the weighted average number of varieties in services, 
22 For all the values reflecting the ‘capacity to recover lost trade due to Brexit' in Table 5, we take the absolute values of trade 
with third nations (or intra‐EU trade) in the numerator and divide them by the absolute values of trade lost by one of the 
Brexit partners in trading with the other Brexit partner. Trade between the Brexit partners falls in most of the cases, so we 
take its absolute value (without the minus).
23 This result occurs without taking into account possible FTAs between the UK and third countries that might be negotiated 
and adopted after Brexit.
24 In this negative case (−6.6%), UK does not increase its exports to other partners as it does in the rest of scenarios. Instead, 
the UK decreases them, thus, losing not only exports going to the EU but also UK's exports going to third partners.
25 The only slightly positive changes are observed in other machinery and construction.
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which includes both domestic and FDI firms weighted with their market shares, we observe a decline 
across all services' sectors for both Brexit partners with stronger reductions in the UK (see Table 7). 
Moreover, increased protectionism forces highly productive REU firms to exit from British market in 
all Melitz sectors with the highest reduction in supplied varieties by 88.86% in food processing in the 
case of hard Brexit (see Table 8). British firms are also forced to exit the REU market and to switch to 
domestic supply in order to replace the lost imports. In general, we observe an increase in the number 
of domestic varieties for both sides but with much higher changes in the case of the UK. And while 
the total number of consumed varieties in the REU is negative across all the sectors, it is positive for 
the UK, providing a misleading impression of a positive result. It turns to be a negative effect once 
firm‐level prices and quantities of heterogeneous firms are taken into account. To evaluate the variety 
impact in Melitz sectors, we calculate the Feenstra ratio – an index of the consumption‐side variety 
impacts on welfare suggested by Feenstra (2010), which accounts for differentiated firm‐level prices 
in the context of Melitz model. Table 6 illustrates the percentage changes (relative to unity) in the 
Feenstra ratio for all Melitz sectors and indicates welfare losses along the extensive margin for both 
the UK and REU. Thus, UK's losses are much higher illustrating the fact that the UK loses many im-
ported varieties (produced by highly productive European firms) with low prices and high quantities, 
while the new domestic varieties are produced by firms with lower productivity and therefore at high 
prices and small quantities.
T A B L E  1 1  Piecemeal sensitivity analysis: impact of the hard Brexit on the UK and REU
Parameter
Parameter value
Equivalent variation as a % of consumption
UK REU
Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj) 
– services
2.5 3 3.5 −3.65 −3.17 −2.93 −0.69 −0.59 −0.54
σ(qi, qj) 
– goods
3 3.8 4.6 −3.33 −3.17 −3.07 −0.62 −0.59 −0.57
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 −2.77 −3.17 −3.68 −0.46 −0.59 −0.77
σ(D, M) ×0.5 ×1 ×1.5 −3.11 −3.17 −3.21 −0.59 −0.59 −0.59
σ(M, M) ×0.5 ×1 ×1.5 −3.27 −3.17 −3.11 −0.61 −0.59 −0.58
σ(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 −3.17 −3.17 −3.17 −0.59 −0.59 −0.59
σ(A1,…An) 0 0 0.25 NA −3.17 −3.22 NA −0.59 −0.60
ε(fi) ×0.75 ×1 ×1.25 −3.08 −3.17 −3.23 −0.58 −0.59 −0.59
θm 0.025 0.05 0.075 −3.13 −3.17 −3.21 −0.58 −0.59 −0.60
π 0.25 0.5 0.75 −3.69 −3.17 −3.08 −0.79 −0.59 −0.59
α 3.924 4.582 5.171 −3.19 −3.17 −3.14 −0.59 −0.59 −0.58
Notes: σ(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors. σ(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution 
between value‐added and business services. σ(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and imports in CRTS sectors. 
σ(M, M): Elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions in CRTS sectors. σ(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between 
primary factors of production in value added. σ(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite 
Armington aggregate goods. ε(fi): Elasticities of imperfectly competitive firms' supply with respect to the price of their outputs. θm: 
Shares of value added in multinational firms due to specialised primary factor imports. π: Share of capital remuneration of multina-
tional firms. α: Shape parameter for the Pareto distribution (Melitz). Note that the assumed values here are estimated by Balistreri et 
al. (2011).
Source: Authors' estimates.
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4.1.3 | Total exports, imports and production in a sector by sector analysis
The aforementioned reductions in bilateral trade flows translate into overall reductions in exports and 
imports across the board in both the REU and UK. However, they are more intense for trade flows of 
the UK than for REU, as the REU accounts for a larger share of UK's trade than vice versa (see Tables 
1 and 2). This is what we see in Table 9, which offers the evolution of total exports and imports of 
each sector in the UK and REU after the soft and hard Brexit. In particular, aggregate exports shrink 
by −7.54% and −16.94% in the UK after the soft and hard Brexit, respectively, while in the REU they 
go down only by −1.54% and −3.48%, respectively. Similarly, aggregate imports of the UK decrease 
by −6.44% and −14.42% in the UK, whereas in the REU they decline only by −1.69% and −3.82% 
after the soft and hard Brexit, respectively. The strongest reductions in trade flows occur in sectors 
such as food, agriculture, motor vehicles, other primary and textiles, thus in the sectors with the high-
est barriers to trade.26 While imports decline in all sectors of both regions27 as well as British exports 
fall in all sectors, the REU is able to increase its exports of services such as construction, air transport, 
insurance, other and personal services in the case of hard Brexit.28 These developments even lead to a 
small increase in total European services exports by 0.07% in the hard Brexit scenario, mainly due to 
increased trade with the rest of the world.
The contraction of foreign trade is associated with the more sizeable output reductions in the UK 
compared to the REU (see Table 9). Aggregate output in the REU is nearly unaffected after both 
the soft (−0.15%) and hard Brexit (−0.33%). However, in the UK the overall contraction constitutes 
−1.11% and −2.46% for the soft and hard Brexit, respectively. Moreover, UK's total output of services 
goes down by −1.35% versus −0.67% in manufactures in the soft Brexit scenario, while in the hard 
Brexit case these figures amount to −3.02% versus −1.46%, respectively.
In general, output contractions are more intense in the sectors that experience stronger reductions 
in trade due to the emergence of larger barriers to trade and FDI. Thus, in the REU production falls 
stronger in food processing, motor vehicles and agriculture, while slightly positive changes occur in 
other transport, machinery and water transport mainly to satisfy domestic demand. In the UK, the 
strongest reductions in output are observed in sectors such as other primary, electronics, air transport 
and business services. The evolution of food and motor vehicles in the UK is exceptional, however, 
because their output rises. These sectors are the most dependent on imports coming from the REU. As 
shown in Table 2, 74.7% and 84.3% of their imports come from the REU, while the average across 
manufactures is 49.9%. This fact combined with rather large NTBs and tariffs bring about a very re-
markable reduction in its overall imports. Although their exports also fall, the need to saturate domes-
tic demand for motor vehicles and food products leads to increases in their production.29 The number 
26 This confirms that sector‐specific NTBs are very important for measurement of Brexit impact. However, this aspect has 
been neglected in some analyses of Brexit, which use homogeneous NTBs across sectors (e.g. Ottaviano et al., 2014; Dhingra 
et al., 2017).
27 Except the imports of air transport services in the UK for hard Brexit case, which has been already described above.
28 Note that these sectors, in general, tend to face the smallest NTBs to trade across all the sectors and no tariffs.
29 We additionally performed a sensitivity analysis to further analyse the evolution of motor vehicle sector as example. For 
this purpose, we redistributed UK's total imports by the region of origin: we reduced the share of imports from the REU to 
19% and doubled the one from other regions. The results indicate that being less dependent on REU imports, sector's output 
would also go down just like in the rest of sectors. Note also that only a small share of imports of this sector is used as 
intermediates (18.28%). The same applies for food industry where only 26.12% of imports are intermediates, in contrast to the 
rest of sectors with an average of 56%. The particular use of imports for intermediates and (different types of) final demand 
plays a significant role to explain the differential behaviour of sectors, as has been deeply analysed in Zhou & Latorre (2014a, 
2014b).
20 |   LATORRE ET AL.
of domestic firms confirms this development as it increases strongly in these sectors with the highest 
value of 19.61% in the motor vehicle production, followed by 13.65% in food processing (Table 8). 
Thus, less productive British firms enter the local market to supply products at high prices and low 
quantities (i.e. losses along the extensive margin are the highest in motor vehicles and food processing, 
see Feenstra ratio in Table 6).
In sum, the microeconomic results reflect a much stronger impact of Brexit in the UK than in REU 
for exports, imports and output on a sector by sector basis. The two regions are, of course, quite dif-
ferent in size. This implies that small percentage changes in the REU may seem very limited for the 
entire region, but may also hide more sizeable impacts for the individual countries. This is certainly 
an issue for future research. However, two important conclusions can be derived from our outcomes so 
far. First, the damage derived for the UK is sizeable because nearly half of its aggregate imports and 
exports will experience the emergence of barriers. None of the countries within REU will have such 
a strong relationship with the UK alone. Therefore, in all likelihood the impact for all the countries 
within the REU would be less intense than the one for the UK.
A second important conclusion from these results is that the REU as a whole is not much affected 
by Brexit. This region is an important player in world imports and exports. Therefore, it would have 
had the capacity to bring about important trade diversion or creation effects. However, because the 
REU is not much affected, the latter effects are small. We will confirm this now by looking at the 
macroeconomic impact for all the regions included in our model.
4.2 | Macroeconomic impact
Table 10 offers the impact for GDP, welfare, wages, capital remuneration and the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for all the regions considered. For these aggregate variables, we present the effects of the 
different components of Brexit separately as well as the ‘total’ impact for both soft Brexit and hard 
Brexit. Thus, for the soft Brexit, which appears on the left, we include increases in NTBs to trade 
(labelled as "NTBs" in the table) and increases in NTBs to FDI (labelled as "FDI barriers") and their 
joint impact ("Total"). For the hard Brexit, we add the impact of MFN tariffs (labelled as "Tariffs") to 
the two former components, which now imply larger increases than in the case of the soft Brexit (as 
reflected in Table 3).
In line with the evolution of trade and output results on sectoral level, we observe a much stron-
ger reduction in UK's GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration than in the REU. GDP in the 
UK could experience a contraction between −1.23% and −2.53% in the case of soft and hard Brexit, 
respectively. In contrast, for the REU the fall in GDP is only between −0.16% and −0.35%. Welfare 
reductions, measured as Hicks equivalent variation of consumption, are more pronounced than the 
ones of GDP: UK's welfare loss reaches −3.17% in the hard Brexit scenario, while the one for the 
REU amounts to −0.59%. Translating the percentage changes in welfare into billions of US dollars in 
2020 (which is the base year of our simulations), the value of maximal consumption loss after the hard 
Brexit constitutes 62.701 $billions for the UK and 57.977 $billions for the REU. In the case of soft 
Brexit, the drain would be of 30.818 $billions (−1.56%) in the UK and of 26.178 $billions (−0.27%) 
in the REU.
Concerning factor remuneration, British workers and capital owners would suffer more from Brexit 
than the ones in the REU. In particular, the maximal reduction in wages and capital remuneration in 
the hard Brexit scenario amounts to −2.83% and −3.34% in the UK, while in the REU it takes only 
−0.39% and −0.43%, respectively. Moreover, in the UK the decline in wages is lower than in capital 
returns indicating a relatively lower demand for capital that occurs due to a reallocation of production 
to the labour‐intensive sectors (e.g. food processing and motor vehicles with the share of labour in 
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value added of 60% and 80%, respectively). Capital owners lose stronger from FDI barriers as a part 
of capital in services is sector‐specific and cannot reallocate due to emergence of new inefficiencies.
Looking at the distribution of the negative impact among the different types of barriers, NTBs 
to trade account for the largest share of the total negative impact. More precisely, in the hard Brexit 
simulation the rise of NTBs constitutes over one half of the total negative effect for both the UK and 
REU across macroeconomic variables such as GDP and welfare. FDI barriers also play a significant 
role, since they explain approximately one third of the decrease in GDP and welfare in the two regions. 
The results for wages and capital remuneration also run in parallel to the ones for GDP and welfare 
implying that NTBs to trade account for the largest reduction in factor remunerations.
Generally, higher barriers after Brexit increase prices for imported products in the UK and REU. 
In addition, entry of less productive producers due to increased protectionism also raises prices. This 
leads to a higher Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the UK with the maximal increase of 1.28% in the 
case of hard Brexit (see Table 10), which reduces the demand and consumption of goods and services. 
This in turn drives production and trade down, which is associated with lower demand for inputs and 
therefore lower factor earnings, as described previously. Additionally, there is a considerable welfare 
loss along the extensive margin of trade as indicated previously by the Feenstra ratio. In the case of 
the REU, the impact is not that strong as it is not dependent on the British market as much as the UK 
on the European one. Moreover, as mentioned before, the REU is able to recover much of its trade by 
increasing the unrestricted intra‐REU trade as well as trade with third countries. Therefore, the CPI 
in the REU is almost unaffected or even slightly reduced, while the overall negative Brexit impact is 
quite limited with the highest welfare loss of 0.59%.
Considering other regions of the world, they are nearly unaffected by Brexit. We estimate a small 
percentage variation in welfare for the Middle East region (MEN), other advanced economies (OAC) 
and the United States, which implies a few billions of extra dollars. This even holds for the hard Brexit 
which could result in more intense trade diversion or creation effects. However, since the UK accounts 
for a small share of the world GDP and trade, the potential spillovers from Brexit for outsiders seem 
to be quite damped.
5 |  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As a robustness check of our results, we assess the impact of the key model parameter values in our 
piecemeal sensitivity analysis where we change each parameter one by one, while we keep all other 
parameters unchanged. Table 11 shows how the welfare impacts of the hard Brexit on the UK and 
REU are affected by each parameter. In addition, we re‐run the model with an Armington structure, 
which is the most common and standard specification of trade in the literature and has been widely 
used in previous studies on Brexit.
We see that our welfare results are generally quite robust to the parameters here. The parameter 
that has the strongest impact on the welfare results is the elasticity of substitution between value‐added 
and business services, σ(va, bs). Table 11 shows that the welfare impact of the UK (REU) ranges 
from −2.77% (−0.46%) to −3.68% (−0.77%). This implies 87% (78%) to 116% (130%) relative to the 
central result. When this elasticity is higher, firms can substitute the business services for value‐added 
input more easily, which leads to the larger decrease in the business services from multinational firms 
and cross‐border firms after the Brexit. This is because the latter become more expensive due to Brexit 
barriers. As a result, the production of services is reduced stronger, the business services will be more 
costly, and welfare loss of the economy becomes larger due to reduced number of available varieties 
in the love‐of‐variety setting.
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The elasticities of substitution between firm varieties have modest impact on the welfare results. 
Especially, when the substitution elasticity between firm varieties of service sectors is lower, the 
welfare impact is not small: −3.65% (−0.69%) for the UK (REU) or 115% (117%) for the UK (REU) 
relative to the central results. When this elasticity (for both service sectors and good sectors) is lower, 
the welfare loss becomes larger because lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are less 
close to each other, and thus, fewer varieties are more damaging.
Other than the elasticities of substitution, the share of capital remuneration of multinational firms 
is important. We assume that some portion of the capital remuneration is sent back to the source coun-
tries. When this share is low, more multinational firms leave because they have smaller incentive to 
stay in the host countries in the case of the increased barriers, and thus, the welfare loss becomes 
larger: −3.69% (−0.79%) for the UK (REU) or 117% (134%) for the UK (REU) relative to the central 
results.30 Since the central value (0.5) is already high enough to keep the multinationals, the higher 
share of capital remuneration (0.75) weakens the welfare loss only in a limited way.
The impact of all other parameters on our central welfare results is quite limited. In sum, our wel-
fare results are robust with respect to the key parameters. Especially, the direction of the impact of 
each parameter is always the same for the UK and REU, and thus, the welfare loss of the UK is always 
much larger than that of the REU.
In the simulation with the trade structure of perfect competition for all the sectors, namely 
Armington trade structure, the welfare impact on the UK (REU) is −2.04% (−0.39%) or 64% (66%) 
relative to the central results. Furthermore, if we exclude the FDI barriers, which is basically the 
same setting as Ottaviano et al. (2014) and Dhingra et al. (2017), the welfare impact on the UK 
(REU) is −1.60% (−0.31%) or 51% (52%) relative to the central results. Thus, without the Melitz 
structure and FDI barriers, the welfare impacts would be underestimated significantly.31 A similar 
pattern is illustrated by Balistreri, Olekseyuk, and Tarr (2017) in a single‐country CGE model for the 
WTO accession of Belarus. In particular, they show that an approach limited to the analysis of ser-
vices cross‐border trade under perfect competition would suggest gains more than ten times smaller 
than their findings.
6 |  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we quantify the trade and FDI‐related impact of Brexit using an innovative numerical 
simulation model that splits the world economy into 11 regions, 21 sectors and four factors of produc-
tion. Contrasting with other previous analyses of Brexit, our model incorporates many simultaneous 
features of real economies. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first model combining the 
Melitz (2003) structure in manufactures with the presence of multinationals operating under monopo-
listic competition à la Krugman (1980) in services in all the regions of the multiregional framework. 
To be more precise, the present model is based on the path‐breaking approach of Balistreri et al. 
(2011) and extends the FDI approach of Olekseyuk (2016) to a multiregional setting. In comparison 
with Latorre and Yonezawa (2018) and Latorre et al. (2018), it additionally incorporates the Melitz 
structure in manufacturing.
30 Latorre and Yonezawa (2018) demonstrate the same mechanism (but the direction is opposite because they analyse it in a 
context of decreasing barriers to FDI related to TTIP). When this share is high, the removal of FDI barriers leads to more 
multinationals (they have larger incentive to come to the host countries) and thus larger welfare gain.
31 Trade parameters for the Armington structure are taken from GTAP 9.
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Our results suggest that the UK experiences much more sizeable losses in its welfare, foreign trade, 
production, average industry productivity, wages and capital remuneration than the REU does. In par-
ticular, UK's welfare loss reaches −3.17% in the hard Brexit (i.e. a ‘no deal’) scenario, while the one 
for the REU amounts to −0.59% only. Hereby, the inclusion of FDI in services generates an important 
source for losses, which has often been neglected in other numerical simulation assessments. More 
precisely, an increase in FDI barriers explains approximately one third of the overall fall in GDP, 
welfare and wages in the UK and REU. Our sensitivity analysis additionally illustrates that dropping 
the FDI barriers and monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms (i.e. similar setting to 
Ottaviano et al., 2014 and Dhingra et al., 2017) would generate an underestimated Brexit impact by 
approximately 50%.
The emergence of barriers between the Brexit partners also leads to a reduction in the number of 
available varieties in services, which is more intense in the UK than in the REU. We also observe 
higher welfare losses along the extensive margin for the UK. This illustrates the fact that the UK 
loses many imported varieties (produced by highly productive European firms) with low prices and 
high quantities, while the new domestic varieties are produced by firms with lower productivity and 
therefore at high prices and small quantities. Indeed, the results for average productivity of domestic 
firms in the UK confirm this with a decline by up to −2.27% in several manufacturing sectors such 
as textiles, chemicals, motor vehicles and electronics. Thus, less productive firms enter the British 
market due to increased protectionism and reduced import competition.
Brexit implies a shrinking of the EU market and, in that sense, is not good news for both the UK 
and REU since firms lose sales opportunities. However, given the much larger size of the REU, the 
process is much more harmful for the trade of UK firms. REU firms are better in recovering the lost 
exports in the UK through intra‐EU trade but also by trading more with third nations. In particular, the 
REU recovers around one third of the exports lost in the UK with half of it recovered via an expansion 
of intra‐EU trade. The UK manages to recover less of its exports lost in the REU: while after the soft 
Brexit (i.e. Norway agreement in line with UK's current negotiating position) it may recover around 
7% of lost exports, in the hard Brexit case this number amounts to 1.6% only. Indeed, the hard Brexit 
hurts the UK disproportionately more than the REU.
Assuming no changes in the trade policy against third countries, our assessment suggests that GDP 
and welfare remain nearly unaffected for the outsiders (the US, China, India, Japan, other advanced 
economies, South‐East Asia, Latin America, Middle East and sub‐Saharan Africa). Although Brexit 
may offer good prospects for some manufacturing firms coming from outside the Brexit block, at a 
more aggregate level benefits for outsiders seem quite limited. Thus, Brexit's scope is manly confined 
to the EU landscape.
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APPENDIX 
T A B L E  A 1  Mapping of model sectors to Nace Rev 2, Isic Rev 3.1 and GTAP classifications
Sectors Nace Rev 2 Isic Rev 3.1 GTAP
1. Agriculture A Agriculture, forestry and fishery 
products
ISIC 01–05 1–14
2. Other primary B Mining and quarrying ISIC 10–14 15–18
3. Food C10 Manufacture of food products ISIC 15–16 19–26
C11 Manufacture of beverage
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products
4. Textiles C13 Manufacture of textiles 27–29
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
C15 Manufacture of leather and related 
products
5. Wood and paper C16 Manufacture of wood and products 
of wood, cork, straw and plaiting 
materials
ISIC 20–22 30–31
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper 
products
C18 Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media
6. Chemicals C19 Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products
ISIC 24–25 32–33
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceu-
tical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products
12. Other manufactures C23 Manufacture of other non‐metallic 
mineral products
ISIC 23,26 34,42
7. Metals C24 Manufacture of basic metals ISIC 27–28 35,36,37
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment
10. Electronics C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic 
and optical products
ISIC 30,32 40
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
11. Other machinery C28 Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
ISIC 29,31,33 41
8. Motor vehicles C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trail-
ers and semi‐trailers
ISIC 34 38
9. Other Transport C30 Manufacture of other transport 
equipment
ISIC 35 39
12. Other manufactures C31 Manufacture of furniture ISIC 23,26 34,42
C32 Other manufacturing
(Continues)
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Sectors Nace Rev 2 Isic Rev 3.1 GTAP
11. Other machinery C33 Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment
ISIC 29,31,33 41
21. Other services D Electricity, gas, steam and air condi-
tioning supply
ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56,57
D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air condi-
tioning supply
E Water supply; sewerage, waste man-
agement and remediation activities
E36 Water collection, treatment and 
supply
E37 Sewerage
E38 Waste collection, treatment and 
disposal activities; materials recovery
E39 Remediation activities and other 
waste management services
13. Construction F Construction ISIC 45 46
F41 Construction of buildings
F42 Civil engineering
F43 Specialised construction activities
21. Other services G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles
ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56,57
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles
G454 Sale, maintenance and repair 
of motorcycles and related parts and 
accessories
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles
H49 Land transport and transport via 
pipelines
14. Water transport H50 Water transport ISIC 61 49
15. Air transport H51 Air transport ISIC 62 50
21. Other services H52 Warehousing and support activities 
for transportation
ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56
16. Communications H53 Postal and courier activities ISIC 70–74 51
21. Other services I55 Accommodation ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56,57
I56 Food and beverage service activities
19. Business services J582 Software publishing ISIC 91–93 54
20. Personal services J59 Motion picture, video and television 
programme production, sound recording
ISIC 91–93 55
J60 Programming and broadcasting 
activities
16. Communications J61 Telecommunications ISIC 70–74 51
19. Business services J62 Computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities
ISIC 91–93 54
J63 Information service activities
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
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17. Finance K64 Financial service activities, except 
insurance and pension funding
ISIC 65,67 52
18. Insurance K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension 
funding, except compulsory social 
security
ISIC 66 53
17. Finance K66 Activities auxiliary to financial 
services and insurance activities
ISIC 65,67 52
19. Business services L68 Real estate activities ISIC 91–93 54
M69 Legal and accounting activities
M70 Activities of head offices; manage-
ment consultancy activities
M71 Architectural and engineering activi-
ties; technical testing and analysis
M72 Scientific research and development
M73 Advertising and market research
M74 Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities
M75 Veterinary activities
N77 Rental and leasing activities
N78 Employment activities
21. Other services N79 Travel agency, tour operator reserva-
tion service and related activities
ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56,57
19. Business services N80 Security and investigation activities ISIC 91–93 54
N81 Services to buildings and landscape 
activities
N82 Office administrative, office support 
and other business support activities
21. Other services O – Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security
ISIC 40,41,50,51,52,63,75,80,85,90 43,44,45,47,48,56,57
P – Education
Q – Human health and social work 
activities
20. Personal services R – Arts, entertainment and recreation ISIC 91–93 55
S – Other services activities
S95 Repair of computers and personal 
and household goods
T – Activities of households as employ-
ers; undifferentiated goods and services
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T A B L E  A 2  Mapping of model regions
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East, North 
Africa, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Sub‐Saharan Africa 
Emerging and 
Developing Asia
Other 
advanced 
countries
(Latin America, 
LAC) (Middle‐East, MEN) 
(Sub‐Saharan A., 
SSA)
(Southeast Asia, 
SEA) OAC
Antigua and Barbuda Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Australia
Argentina Algeria Benin Bhutan Canada
The Bahamas Armenia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Hong Kong 
SAR
Barbados Azerbaijan Burkina Faso Cambodia Iceland
Belize Bahrain Burundi Fiji Israel
Bolivia Belarus Cameroon Indonesia Korea
Brazil Djibouti Cape Verde Kiribati New Zealand
Chile Egypt Central African 
Republic
Lao P.D.R. Norway
Colombia Georgia Chad Malaysia Singapore
Costa Rica Iran Comoros Maldives San Marino
Dominica Iraq Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo
Marshall Islands Switzerland
Dominican Republic Jordan Republic of Congo Micronesia Taiwan 
Province of 
China
Ecuador Kazakhstan Côte d'Ivoire Mongolia
El Salvador Kyrgyzstan Equatorial Guinea Myanmar
Grenada Kuwait Eritrea Nepal
Guatemala Lebanon Ethiopia Palau
Guyana Libya Gabon Papua New Guinea
Haiti Mauritania The Gambia Philippines
Honduras Morocco Ghana Samoa
Jamaica Oman Guinea Solomon Islands
Mexico Pakistan Guinea‐Bissau Sri Lanka
Nicaragua Qatar Kenya Thailand
Panama Rest of Eastern Europe Lesotho Timor‐Leste
Paraguay Rest of Former Soviet 
Union
Liberia Tonga
Peru  Russia Madagascar Tuvalu
St. Kitts and Nevis Saudi Arabia Malawi Vanuatu
St. Lucia Sudan Mali Vietnam 
St.Vincent & the 
Grenadines
Syria Mauritius
Suriname Tunisia Mozambique
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Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East, North 
Africa, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Sub‐Saharan Africa 
Emerging and 
Developing Asia
Other 
advanced 
countries
(Latin America, 
LAC) (Middle‐East, MEN) 
(Sub‐Saharan A., 
SSA)
(Southeast Asia, 
SEA) OAC
Trinidad and Tobago Turkey Namibia
Uruguay Ukraine Niger
Venezuela United Arab Emirates Nigeria
Yemen Rwanda
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Note: The classification follows the one of the IMF World Economic Outlook.
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